A Mathematical Model for Resource Sharing with Bilateral Contracts in a Supply Chain with Government Intervention under a Game Theory Approach

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Department of Industrial Engineering, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

2 School of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

3 Research Center of Performance and Productivity Analysis, Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey

4 School of Industrial Engineering, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Contracts have been used for coordination in many supply chain alliances among businesses. Because bilateral contracts are significantly more successful and profitable than uni-contracts, In this article, the issues of implementing bilateral contracts are investigated with the approach of game theory and government intervention to increase bilateral interaction between members of co-production and co-distribution in the supply chain. By adopting the game theory model between these two members of the chain and intervention government, this research seeks to increase production and distribution by making maximum use of the excess capacity of production and distribution in the chain. In this way, the producer uses his surplus capacity in two ways: one is produced directly by the producer and enters the market by the distributor, and the other is an order that the distributor gives to the producer, which is different from the product that the producer produces. It is produced directly and given by the distributor. The purpose of this research is to investigate and analyze the amounts and profits resulting from the participation of production and distribution with government intervention in the supply chain. According to this research, governments should provide an environment for supply chain members to have more cooperation with each other because, in the case of cooperation among supply chain members, the profits of the chain and the members will increase.

Graphical Abstract

A Mathematical Model for Resource Sharing with Bilateral Contracts in a Supply Chain with Government Intervention under a Game Theory Approach

Keywords

Main Subjects


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